

29 April 1953

MEMORANDUM TO: Chief, SR/3

FROM: SR/3 (W1)

Subject: AESAURUS/CACCOLA

Recommendations for 1953-1954 CACCOLA Training and Operations

BACKGROUND

1. The original CARCASS program envisioned the conduct of FI and PP operations by CACCOLA agents. The PP aspect during Cycle A was slighted due to lack of time for training, the mediocre quality of the agent candidates, and the risk such activities would entail for the agents. The NTS operation's chief agreed with this decision and this concept of training was carried on throughout Cycle B.

2. The following facts are believed to be the basis for the field's presentation of an AKTIVIST Program:

- A. NTS primary interest is the destruction of the Soviet regime.
- B. NTS accepted the limitation of CACCOLA training to preparation of the agents as permanent support assets, with minimum orientation towards propaganda activities.
- C. NTS still desires to conduct active propaganda work inside the USSR to increase the chances of overthrowing the Soviet regime.
- D. In order that the CACCOLA support points not be jeopardized the propaganda activities must be carried out by a separate structure:
  - (a) The AKTIVISTS will carry out propaganda work based on the receipt from CACCOLAS of the types of activities and the themes likely to bring about the best results. (See EGMA-3272, page 4, para. 6)

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(b) a "black base"

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- (b) A "black base" support point for material reception and exfiltration purposes.

3. The CACCOLA, AKTIVIST, and "black base" breakdown of the original CARCASS program appears to achieve two primary objectives.

- A. It will allay NTS suspicions that CIA will withdraw its support, leaving CACCOLAS inside the USSR out of NTS control and without the training necessary to accomplish NTS revolutionary aims. This will help assure continuance of NTS-CIA mutual confidence in FI and PP operations.
- B. It is conceived as a method by which CIA would gain NTS agents for specific intelligence missions or the information needed to train and dispatch independent agents for such missions. (See page 5 of EGMA 3272).

4. The field has explicitly stated that the AKTIVIST program is dependent on three factors:

- A. The success of CACCOLA Cycles A, B, and C.
- B. Provision of adequate cadres for both the CACCOLA and AKTIVIST programs.
- C. The availability of instructors for both the CACCOLA and AKTIVIST schools.

5. Specific missions for AKTIVIST propagandists have not yet been outlined. It is stated in EGMA-4571 on page 2 that a separate paper is in preparation on precisely the type of work in which the AKTIVISTS will engage in the USSR. However, a memorandum (attached to EGMA 3272) presented to Boris Martino, George Okolovich and Romanov-Ostrovski received a favorable reaction. This memorandum stated that the AKTIVISTS are to be specialists trained as:

- A. Propagandists
- B. Partisan leaders
- C. Political organizers
- D. Saboteurs, etc.

6. To accomplish

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6. To accomplish the above objectives the field has proposed that:

- A. Six to ten agents be trained for CACCOLA missions.
- B. Dependent on the conditions expressed in paragraph 4 above, four to six agents would be trained as singleton or doubleton AKTIVIST agents.
- C. Training of four W/T and six specialized types be considered for "black base" operations.

7. Headquarters Recommendations:

Due to the lack of experience at DOB in training a group of this size and the initial difficulties in liaison with NTS in Europe, the quality of the representative who will be at the CACCOLA school, and the dislocation of the school from the familiar surroundings of Germany it is recommended that initially a maximum of 12 agent candidates be selected for CACCOLA training. *(See paragraph 9)*

Should conditions in the USSR - based on CACCOLA Cycle B reports and other CIA sources - indicate that propaganda operations are feasible four of the 12 agents may be used for AKTIVIST operations. *(Black base first? etc)*

To train these agents in one safehouse - which DOB has stated is already available - the following NTS personnel should be brought into the country:

- A. Boris Martino - Direct representative of George Okolovich. An excellent trainer, ~~and~~ commanding the complete respect of CIA case officers and NTS agents.
- B. An assistant to Boris Martino - Due to the precarious health of Martino, a person of equal stature must be available for maintenance of discipline and conduct of training.
- C. Aleksandr Vasiliev - A well-trained experienced W/T instructor. His wife, who works as a cook and house-keeper, would accompany him.
- D. Viktor Kopylov - An experienced instructor on the subject of Soviet reality and NTS ideology. He would be accompanied by his wife, an able secretary and librarian.
- E. Ivan Agrusov - An assistant W/T instructor who has extensive experience in radio technical work. He has been at the CACCOLA school in Europe since



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December 1952 and will be as well qualified as Aleksandr Vasiliev when he comes to the United States.

This provides a minimum of five trainers and two wives. A sixth trainer should be considered to lighten the load of Viktor Kopylov.

Since the trainees are to do many of their own housekeeping tasks only one additional person should be needed as a cook and housekeeper and for supervision of the housekeeping staff a Hausmeister might be provided.

8. Since [ ] the present CIA CACCOLA operation's officer will have to undergo four months of basic training in the Army to qualify for deferment, it is recommended that he be called back from Germany as soon as possible. This will provide us with an operation's officer, experienced in working with NTS people, who can oversee the safehouse arrangements and foresee the problems which may arise when the NTS agent candidates and instructors come to the United States.

9. At this time there is no assurance that CIA dispatch facilities and capabilities are such as to promise success in the promulgation of an AKTIVIST program. However, CIA should be prepared for such possibilities and the AKTIVIST program may be one means of assuring our readiness for internal USSR propaganda operations.

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